Some who know me well have trouble seeing how this secret predilection
of mine fits with other things they know about me, such as the more cerebral
preferences suggested by this blawg and political sensibilities that tend
thematically toward peace, love, and understanding. After all, football is a (barely) sublimated
glorification of war. All sports are
really. But football makes the metaphor
impossible to miss. It is, after all, about
conquering territory by overcoming a defensive line while brutes threaten to
drag the standard bearer down to the field with bone-rattling blows, virtually
guaranteed to cause injury, so that, despite the vigilance of bulky guards, simply
crossing the line of scrimmage is a struggle.
But unlike war, with football and other sports, there are
clear rules and referees. There are
predictable ways to assess winners and losers.
And while casualties certainly occur with every play in football, they are
not the principal objective (unless you play defense for the New Orleans
Saints).
Litigation is more like football than war in that
adversaries engage in combat but are tethered by rules and refs. Litigation is more like war than football in
that what it means to “win” can be rather ambiguous and fluid. With legal disputes that turn into litigation
and make it all the way to trial, winning can sometimes feel like
losing—because the victory may ultimately be outweighed by the opportunity
costs (not to mention the actual costs).
Likewise, losing can sometimes feel like winning because, over the
course of a hard-fought legal battle, having that elusive day in court and then
getting some finality can be enough to prompt the healing process at last. Weirder still, the aspects of litigation that
are more like football than war—the rules and the refs—are precisely the part of
the process that laypeople can find exasperating. This is probably because, unlike the rules of
football, most Americans are not weaned on the rules of procedure and the rules
of evidence and so do not understand the massive amounts of discretion that the
refs (aka trial judges) have in overseeing how the game is played. In other words, the aspects of litigation
that seem more like football are actually
far more complex and nuanced than those governing football. And when something we don’t understand seems superficially analogous to
something familiar and then the analogy breaks down, this can, perhaps, breed
more consternation than feelings of total incomprehension. A paradox, indeed.
Shakespeare, of course, had nothing to say about
football. And I do not see much in his
work to suggest that he was much of a sports fan. He used “sport” as a pejorative term to refer
to something pleasurable but mildly sadistic.
See, e.g.: “As flies to wanton boys are we to the gods;
they kill us for their sport.” [King Lear, IV.1]; or this from the
Princess in Love’s Labour’s Lost, as
she embraces a plan whereby the girls intend to humiliate the boys, who have
shunned the girls’ company:
There's no such sport as sport by sport o'erthrown,
To make theirs ours and ours
none but our own:
So shall we stay, mocking
intended game,
And they, well mock'd, depart
away with shame.[V.2]
But maybe there was resentment, a sense that hosting these more primal diversions was a necessary evil to help underwrite more lofty recreation, but not something worth celebrating in and of itself.
In any case, based on the scant evidence, I conclude that
Shakespeare may not have shared my affection for football—or for the game of
litigation. He would, however, have understood
my ambivalence about these things because of their similarity with warfare, a
phenomenon that he occasionally celebrated (Henry
V) but more often exposed as a highly destructive impulse and breeding
ground for unhealthy ambitions (Hamlet,
Macbeth, Othello, Julius Caesar, Titus Andronicus, etc., etc., etc.). Then again, maybe he could have been
convinced that both football and litigation are actually good things precisely
because they are substitutes for war and thus earmarks of civilization. . . .