She puts the period often from his place;
And midst the sentence so her accent
breaks,
That twice she doth begin ere once she
speaks.
The
Rape of Lucrece, Stanza 81
The “PrawfsBlawg” is currently hosting a contest.
It seeks nominations for “the worst sentence in the history of American
judicial opinions.” Sadly, viable contenders abound. The Prawfs provide this
example from the Supreme Court’s 1851 decision in Cooley v. Board of Wardens:
This would be to affirm that the nature of the power is in
any case, something different from the nature of the subject to which, in such
case, the power extends, and that the nature of the power necessarily demands,
in all cases, exclusive legislation by Congress, while the nature of one of the
subjects of that power, not only does not require such exclusive legislation,
but may be best provided for by many different systems enacted by the states,
in conformity with the circumstances of the ports within their limits.
Cooley is
routinely taught as a seminal case about the relationship between the states’ police
power and the federal government’s power under the Constitution’s Commerce
Clause. In the case, the Court held that
a Pennsylvania law, which required that all ships entering or leaving
Philadelphia hire a local pilot, did not offend the Constitution.
Okay, so what? The point of this post is offensive sentences,
not offenses to the Constitution.
This 91-word monstrosity from Cooley is indeed offensive; it offends the senses because its sense
is so hard to ascertain. No wonder so few law school graduates know how to write
when this is what is offered up as an exemplar of judicial analytical prose.
To be fair, texts, in the form of case law, are not selected
for inclusion in law course curricula because they exemplify scintillating (or
even workmanlike) prose. Generally, judicial
opinions are selected as vehicles for teaching law students because they show
the emergence of some legal proposition deemed important for understanding how some
doctrinal area of the law has evolved. The writing is just what one has to slog
through to ferret out the all-important proposition.
There is a painful irony in this, of course. For let’s be
frank: even mathematicians care a great deal about values like “elegance” and “simplicity”
and “accessibility” when it comes to solving elusive theorems. Yet The Law,
where the medium is, ineluctably, language itself, readers are often subjected
to language devoid of craft—or at least composed with little regard for the aesthetic
values that guide many others who write for a living.
I admit that I continue to struggle with offensive
sentences, constructions bloated beyond measure. I attribute this tendency to a
childhood spent reading 19th century novels instead of doing my
homework. Early on, I developed a pronounced attraction to esoteric and
convoluted word play. The Faulkernian, Proustian, Dickensian, Bronte-an, Dostoyevsky-an,
compound-complex convolution continues to hold secret sway over my instinctual
pleasure centers. Yet I have learned to resist the impulse to subject the
readers of my (legal) writing to these highly subjective preferences. At the very
least, I have learned to make a habit of rooting out the results of these
deep-seated impulses while reviewing and revising my legal work. Because, ultimately, I’ve accepted that the
impulse runs counter to the goal of effective communication.
Alas, what may appeal to some small contingent of eccentrics
does not tend to work for a general readership. And although most legal writing
will be consumed by a minuscule rather than a general audience, legal writing today
is supposed to aim for accessibility above all. For easing others’ pain. For
cutting through the mire. Because all that law stuff is difficult and dense and
incomprehensible enough as it is. See excerpt,
supra, Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
Some readers (should such readers exist) might find it odd
that I am urging legal writers to strive for simple sentence structures. This
blawg is, after all, devoted to holding the flame aloft for William S. But that guy really did know his way around a
sentence. His form demanded certain contortions and permitted other
indulgences. But when it comes to crafting a succinct zinger, the man knew how
to deliver. Moreover, he recognized that having fun with sentences was among
the few activities separating us from other beasts. As Feste, the Clown in Twelfth Night, says: “A sentence is but a cheveril glove to a good
wit: how quickly the wrong side may be turned outward!” [III.1] And as Viola
says, prettily in response: “ Nay, that's certain; they that dally nicely with
words may quickly make them wanton.”
So let’s have no wanton dallying with words such that our
sentences disgrace us.
P.S. Special thanks
to Kasia for the inspiration.
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